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3.

STATEMENT OF CASE

i. Nature of the Case
This is a

first party under insured motorist dispute.

The

appeal challenges a District Court decision that refused to follow
the

majority

of

jurisdictions

that

apply

the

constructive

exhaustion rule for this underinsured motorist claim to proceed.
ii.

Course of Proceedings Below

The plaintiff first filed the underlying liability case of
Marcie Rae Hill v. Joseph and Andrea Hamilton; Bingham County Case

No.

CV-2006-1777.

There were

settlement discussions

that' took

place, between depositions of witnesses, with an offer to settle
within policy limits before the next sCheduled deposition.
parties

agreed

to

settle

the

case

for

$24,000.00

subject

The
to

verification of the defendants' insurance coverage.
The

plaintiff

Hill

filed

her

underinsurance benefits and demand for
against American Family Mutual
2008.

verified

complaint

for

jury trial in this case

Insurance Company on August 27,

A copy of the verified complaint with exhibits is found in

the CLERK'S RECORD on appeal at pages 1-59.
The defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company filed
their Answer and demand for jury trial on October 3, 2008.

See R.

60-65.

The answer claimed that the plaintiff Hill had failed to

exhaust

the

$25,000.00

policy

limits

so

that

no

underinsured

benefits are due.
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The plaintiff Hill then filed a motion for summary judgment on
December 22, 2008.

See R.

66-68.

The motion was supported by a

memorandum and brief filed that same date.

See R.

69-89.

The defendant American Family Mutual Insurance Company filed
a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 26, 2008.
90-91.

See R.

The defendants also filed a memorandum in opposition to the

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and brief in support of
their motion for summary judgment.
The appellant then

filed a

motion for summary judgment.

See R. 92-195.

reply brief in

See R. 96-104.

support of her

The defendants then

filed a reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary

judgment on January 13, 2009.

See R. 1l0-1l5.

A hearing was held on the motions on January 21,

2009 with

District Court Judge Stephen Dunn presiding, that was reported in
the

transcript

on

appeal.

The

court

noted

that

this

was

an

interesting issue of first impression that the Idaho Supreme Court
would have to ultimately resolve and decide.

Tr. 23-24.

The Court issued it's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on February 10, 2009.
The District Judge found that,

See R.

116.

"It is the Court's view that the

clear majority of jurisdictions have adopted Hill's position.
substantial minority of cases have held to the contrary."
123.

However,

the Court

then granted the

A

See R.

respondent American

Family Mutual Insurance Company motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the case.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

R. 117-128.

This appeal followed.
2

iii.

A Concise Statement of Facts

The facts in this case are taken from the verified complaint
for insurance benefits and demand for

jury trial;

see R.

l-ll.

These facts are set forth for the court virtually verbatim below.
A.
1.

The plaintiff,

PARTIES

Marcie Rae Hill,

at all times material

hereto was a citizen and resident of Bingham County, Idaho.
2.

The defendant, American Family Mutual Insurance Company,

dba American Family Insurance, is

-a

foreign insurance corporation

licensed to do business in the State of Idaho.
3.

This Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction;

and venue is proper in this Court against a foreign corporation.
The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.00 so jurisdiction is
proper in District Court.
B.
4.
in

force

THE INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN FORCE

The plaintiff Hill at all times material to this case had
a

policy

of

automobile

American Family Insurance.

insurance

with

the

defendant

A true and correct copy of this entire

insurance policy is attached to the verified complaint

(but not

this brief) as Exhibit 1, R. 15-35.
5.

The policy of insurance attached as Exhibit 1 contained

coverage for underinsured drivers.

The policy clearly provides

underinsured motorist coverage up to a limit of $100,000.00 per
person or $300,000.00 for each accident.
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6.

There was also in force, at times material to this case,

a policy of automobile insurance between Joseph and Andrea Hamilton
and Farm Bureau Insurance Company.

A copy of this insurance policy

is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 2, R. 36-52.
7.

This policy of insurance attached to the complaint as

Exhibit 2 had coverage policy limits of $25,000.00 per person.
C.

THE FACTS OF THE COLLISION OF HAMILTON WITH HILL

S.

On or about Monday, November 7, 2005 plaintiff Hill was

driving a 1999 Chrysler four-door sedan (VIN No. 2C3HD46J6XH604760)
southbound in

the

inside

lane

of traffic on

South Yellowstone

Highway in Idaho Falls at about 3:38 p.m.
9.
driving

On or about Monday, November 7, 2005 Andrea Hamilton was

a

1995

Ford

CNT

four-door

vehicle

(VIN

No.

1FALP65LSSKl14489) east bound stopped in a driveway heading onto
South Yellowstone Highway.

Defendant Andrea Hamil ton. went to make

a left turn and pulled directly into the path of the plaintiff
Hill's vehicle causing a sudden and unexpected collision.

This

vehicle was owned by Joseph Hamilton, who had authority to decide
whether or not she drove the vehicle.
10.

The plaintiff Hill honked her horn,

and turned the wheel but there was then a
painful collision that she could not avoid.

applied the brakes
sudden,

violent and

The plaintiff Hill was

not negligent or at fault at all in this case.
11.

A copy of the Idaho Motor Vehicle Collision Report in

this case is attached to the complaint as Exhibit 3, R. 53-55.
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12.

The defendant Andrea Hamilton was 15 years old at the

time of the accident and had only been licensed for a few months at
the time.

Defendant Andrea Hamilton admitted that she had been

talking on her cell phone at about the time of the accident and
also admitted the accident was her fault and apologized for the
accident.

Defendant Andrea Hamilton pled guilty to a violation of

Idaho Code §

49-641 on turning left while failing to yield the

right of way to another vehicle.

However, Hamilton alleged that

there was comparative fault on plaintiff Hill's part in this case.
D.
13.

PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES, LOSSES, DAMAGES AND INSURANCE
The

plaintiff

Hill

was

transported

to

Eastern

Idaho

Regional Medical Center by her husband following the motor vehicle
accident.

Plaintiff Hill complained of back pain, and right leg

pain just below the knee.

The emergency room doctors found that

she did suffer from back pain,

and right knee pain.

A physical

examination showed some bilateral paralumbar spasm and tenderness
in plaintiff Hill's back, with a contusion and some tenderness over
her right knee patellar tendon.
14.

Subsequently,

the

plaintiff

difficulty with her right knee.

Hill

continued

to

have

The plaintiff Hill then sought

treatment from Dr. Brumfield with the Community Care Clinic, who
found that her knee would lock up and she had swelling in her knee
and calf.

She was placed in a knee brace and on pain medication

and was placed on work restriction because of the pain from the
knee injury.
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15.

The plaintiff Hill then had an MRI at the Mountain View

Hospital in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
anterior aspect of the

This showed a ganglion cyst in the

intra condylar notch that was apparently

caused by the injury and collision in this case.
16.

The plaintiff Hill was then referred for treatment to

Casey Huntsman,
Medicine.

M.D.

of Huntsman Orthopaedic Surgery and Sports

Dr. Huntsman saw plaintiff Hill on December 6, 2005 for

pain in her right knee.

He notes that she was treated by Dr.

Brumfield at the Community Care Clinic and placed in a knee brace
and, after the MRI,

found that she had some right knee damage so

she was referred for further treatment.

Plaintiff Hill reported

that the pain got worse and she had popping and catching as well as
giving way.

Dr. Huntsman found that she had a positive patellar

grind test with a 1+ crepitus

(crackling and popping) and motion

mainly in the anterior aspect of her knee,

with a ganglion cyst

from the anterior cruciate ligament injury and a sprain of the
fibular collateral ligament.
17.

Dr.

Huntsman

then prescribed treatment

Physical Therapy for the swelling in her knee.

from Channing

She had limi ted

range of motion with significant knee pain and crepitus in the
knee.

The compression test reproduced the symptoms of the injury.

The plaintiff Hill then obtained physical therapy for some months
and gradually got better, but eventually reached a plateau where
she did not improve and further treatment was actually causing her
more

harm and pain.

Therefore,

plaintiff Hill

terminated her

treatment at Channing Physical Therapy in December of 2005.
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18.

Dr. Huntsman recommended conservative care to see if her

knee would improve over time.
came back and saw Dr.

In January of 2006 plaintiff Hill

Huntsman again and he noted that she was

somewhat (30%) better, but the doctor noted that her knee still had
crepitus, with a positive patellar grind test.

The assessment at

that time was a patellar contusion with collateral ligament strain.
The

plaintiff

Hill

was

treated

conservatively

with

anti-

inflammatory injections and told to stretch her legs.
19.

The

plaintiff

Hill

was

then

inj ected

with

an

anti-

inflammatory injection, but this trigger point injection did not
improve

her

condition.

She

then

had

another

trigger

point

injection on March 23, 2006 which helped a little but then at that
point her condition was as bad as it was before.

The plaintiff

Hill's knee was locking up and she could not even ride a bike.

The

doctor found that there was a cartilage problem and since they had
treated her

conservatively

for

five

and a

half months

it was

determined that surgical intervention is definitely indicated and
recommended by the doctor to the plaintiff Hill.
20.

Dr. Huntsman has stated that a right knee arthroscopy for

diagnostic purposes and to treat any problems that were found was
indicated and prescribed in this case.

Dr.

payment

resources

but plaintiff did not

have

any

Huntsman requested
to

pay

this

expense even after settling her case with the Hamiltons.
21.
diagnostic

The

cost

and

of

the

treatment

right

knee

purposes

is

arthroscopic
estimated

Orthopaedic to be about an additional $6,700.00,
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surgery
by

for

Huntsman

plus a similar

7

amount for the hospital, or about $13,500.00 to $14,000.00 total.
Plaintiff Hill also had other damages including her medical bills
incurred to date, accrued lost wages, pain and suffering.
22.

Plaintiff Hill also has lost wages from this accident in

the amount of about $2,190.00 or more.

E.

EXHAUSTION OF BENEFITS ON HAMILTON'S FARM BUREAU POLICY
23.

The plaintiff

Marcie Rae Hill v.

1777.

The

the

underlying

liability case of

Joseph and Andrea Hamilton; Case No. CV-2006li~igated

This case was
24.

filed

owner

of

the

vigorously for over a year.
motor

vehicle

in

this

defendant Joseph Hamilton, was insured by Farm Bureau.

case,

the

There was

a request for production of his insurance policy but this was not
produced until a request from his counsel for settlement for policy
limits was made during depositions and prior to trial.
25.

There

were

settlement

discussions

that

took

place

following the deposition of Lynn H. Woodland in the case of Marcie
Rae Hill v. Joseph and Andrea Hamilton; Case No. CV-2006-1777.

The

defendants advised that their policy limits in this case were only
$25,000.00.

This had not been previously discussed or produced in

discovery, and a copy of the declaration sheet was requested so the
plaintiff could verify this information.
showed

that

there

were

policy

limits

The declaration sheet
for

bodily

injury

of

$25,000.00 for each person, or $50,000.00, per occurrence, for two
or more people.

This is consistent with the minimum requirements

of Idaho law for liability insurance coverage found at Idaho Code
§

49-117 et seq.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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26.

The defendants

policy limits offer,

Hamilton stated they would consider a

so the plaintiff Hill made a policy limits

offer for $25,000.00, plus the other available coverage that may
apply.

The defendants Hamilton counter offered with $23,000.00

only if accepted before the deposition of the next witness.
27.

The parties agreed to settle the case

for

$24,000.00

subject to additional property damage coverage and verification of
the defendants' insurance coverage on full review of the complete
verified copy of the declaration sheet and policy under oath by
Farm Bureau.
28.

There was no reasonable alternative to settlement because

of the costs of going to trial, the risk of an adverse result based
on the disputed liability and damages,

and the potential for an

award to the defendants Hamilton of costs and/or attorney fees.
29.

In this case the plaintiff Hill takes the position that

she has exhausted by settlement
defendants

Hamilton

and

Farm

th~

limits of liability with the

Bureau.

She

pursued

that

case

vigorously through litigation and it was only in the middle of
depositions that Hamilton and Farm Bureau made an offer to settle
for $24,000.00, which is basically the amount of the policy limits
in this case,

on the condition that the settlement be accepted

immediately due to the pending depositions and trial.

Therefore,

the plaintiff Hill made all reasonable good faith efforts she could
to exhaust the limits of liability by settlement in this case.
30.
American

The

plaintiff

Family

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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acknowledges
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should

that
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the
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for

the
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additional $1,000.00 that may have allegedly been available from
the Hamilton and Farm Bureau policy in this case.

Therefore, the

plaintiff Hill's underinsured motorist claim against the defendant
American Family Insurance Company for the total sum of $18,000.00
(rather than the $19,000.00 earlier claimed) which gives American
Family

Insurance

Company

credit

for

the

total

amount

of

the

Hamilton and Farm Bureau policy in effect at the time.
F.

CLAIM FOR AMERICAN FAMILY UNDERINSURANCE BENEFITS

31.

As a result of said acdident, the plaintiff Hill suffered

substantial
damages,

damages,

past

and

including

future

but

medical

not

limited

expenses,

to,

economic

property
and

non-

economical damages, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of
life beyond the
Bureau policy.

$25,000.00 policy limits

of the Hamilton Farm

Her knee surgery alone will cost and additional

$14,000.00 or more.
32.

Subsequently, the plaintiff Hill informed the defendant

American Family that Andrea Hamilton's insurance coverage with Farm
Bureau

Insurance was

not

sufficient to

compensate her

for

her

damages and that she was making a claim against the underinsured
motorist coverage under her policy.
33.

The plaintiff Hill forwarded to the defendant American

Family her last settlement demand to Farm Bureau on their insured
Hamilton.
$43,000.00.

This letter made a final total last settlement demand of
However, the plaintiff Hill's damages could be much

greater than this figure but this represented a fair compromise of
her claim based on the facts in this case.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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the

American

System)

claim

Family
form

Insurance
in

this

Company

case

ICS

showing

(Integrated

that

American

Claims
Family

Insurance Company established an under insured motorist claim limit
reserve of $5,000.00 on this claim.

A true and correct copy of

this document is attached as Exhibit 104 and is bates stamp marked
as HI1100002; and is found at R. 88.
The plaintiff appellant also augmented the record below and on
appeal with a page from the American Family Insurance Company Excel
Manual produced in discovery marked as HI1100339 (Exhibit 106), in
the supplement to the record.

This policy manual summarizes Idaho

law generally but then states that, "If consent to settle is given
for an amount less than UIM insurance limits, make sure any setoff
is allowed for the full amount of UIM tortfeasor's policy."

H.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS

The plaintiff Hill

then

filed

a

response

to

Family motion for summary judgment on the facts.

the American
This reply is

found at R. 96-104 and is set out below.
1.

Factually, American Family admits that Ms. Hamilton was

primarily responsible for the accident.

Further,

the defendant

correctly states that the plaintiff Hill settled for $24,000.00,
$1,000.00 less than the limit contained in the Hamilton's liability
policy.

Moreover, American Family notes that Hill is pursuing a

claim for underinsured motorist coverage against American Family
for $18,000.00 giving American Family full credit for the policy
limits of the Hamilton Farm Bureau policy.

APPE11ANT'S BRIEF

12

2.

There are two points with which the plaintiff takes issue

with American Family.

First, the plaintiff did request production

of the Farm Bureau policy in the litigation and later when the
offer to settle within policy limits was made.

Second, during this

period of time, the plaintiff thought she had "bare bones" coverage
and did not understand that she had under insured motorist coverage
available that would be voided by accepting the Farm Bureau offer.

See Affidavit of Marcie Rae Hill in Augmented Record on appeal.
3 . . I n the prior case of Hill v Hamilton, the plaintiff filed
a

reques~

for production of documents to Ms. Hamilton's counsel and

the defendants

filed

"Defendant's Answers

to

Plaintiff's

First

Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests
for Admission" that are attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of
Christopher

Graham

in

this

case.

A copy

of

the

Farm

Bureau

insurance policy was requested in Request for Production Number 4,
Page 9.

There was an objection to production of this document, and

a statement that the policy was produced.
Farm Bureau's
policy

to

counsel did not attach a

the

responses

to

the

However, the defendant
copy of

request

for

this

insurance

production

as

represented in the response that was filed with the Court.
4.

Therefore,

the

plaintiff Hill

did

inquire

as

to

the

limits of liability insurance in place but Farm Bureau did not
respond by production of the policy until a later request was made
that the plaintiff provide an offer to them within their policy

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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limits that had to be accepted immediately.

The plaintiff Hill

accepted the offer contingent on production of the policy that
showed $25,000.00 in policy limits existed in that case.
5.

The plaintiff Hill did not have access to her American

Family Insurance policy at the time the plaintiff settled the case
because the policy was several years old and she did not have it in
her possession.
nbare

bones"

Moreover, she thought at that time that she had a
policy

of

under insured motorist

insurance

coverage

and

existed at

was

not

the

aware

time.

that

She

was

certainly not aware of the exhaustion policy limits requirement at
the

time

she

settled

the

case

with

Farm Bureau,

and did

not

understand that this coverage would be voided by accepting the Farm
Bureau offer.
6.

The plaintiff Hill takes the position that there should

be a setoff allowed for the full amount of the UIM tortfeasor's
policy which gives American Family Insurance Company the benefit of
their policy so that they suffer no prejudice in this case.
The

court

at

the

hearing

on

the

summary

inquired on these issues as well at Tr. 10-11.

judgment

motion

Hill had not read

the policies at issue when the case was settled because of the time
constraints involved and deadline to acceptance of the offer.
10-11.
it

was

Tr.

She did not actually have her American Family policy until
produced

litigation.

in

response

to

the

demand

letters

in

this

Tr. page 11, lines 16-17 and page 19.
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The court then inquired as to the reasonable or constructive
exhaustion of the American Family policy.

Hill's counsel noted

that there was no reasonable alternative to settlement since it
would

cost

several

thousand

dollars

to

obtain,

additional $1,000.00 in insurance benefits.

at

most

Further,

an

there was

some down side risk of an adverse award of costs and attorney fees
(at that time under the overruled case law of Gillihan v. Gump, 140
Idaho

693,

99

P3d,

1083

(Ct.

App.

2003).

Tr.

12-13

and

16.

Finally, it is in the interests of judicial economy to try the case
just once,
benefits.

and not twice,

in order to obtain the under insured

Tr. 17.

In response

to

the court's question,

counsel

for American

Family could not identify any harm or prejudice to American Family
from the constructive exhaustion doctrine.

See Tr. 27-28, defense

counsel states he is not sure Insurance Company

harmed.

American

Family was concerned about where the courts draw the line on these
types of claims.

4.

Issues on Appeal

A statement of the issues on appeal are as follows:
a.

Whether Marcie

Rae

Hill

reasonably or

constructively

exhausted the insurance policy of Farm Bureau Mutual
Company as

required by her policy with American

Insurance

Family Mutual

Insurance Company?
b.

Whether

Idaho

should

,

follow

the

clear

majority

of

jurisdictions that have adopted the constructive exhaustion rule?
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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5.

ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

The plaintiff and appellant Marcie Rae Hill claims attorney's
fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §

41-1839.

This statute

provides for an award of attorney's fees to insureds in lawsuits
against insurers.

6.
A.

ARGUMENT

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN INSURANCE INTERPRETATION DISPUTES
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently discussed once again the

standards for interpretation of an insurance contract in a summary
judgment motion.

In Arreguin

v.

Farmers

Insurance Company of

Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 180 P.3d 498 (March 31, 2008) the court said:
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary
judgment, this Court uses the same standard a district
court uses when it rules on a summary judgment motion.
Jordan v. Beeks, l35 Idaho 586, 589, 21 p.3d 908, 911
(2001). Summary judgment shall be rendered when "the
pleadings, depOSitions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court will liberally construe the
record in favor of the party opposing the motion for
summary judgment and will draw all reasonable inferences
and conclusions in favor of that party. Farmers Ins. Co.
of Idaho v. Talbot, l33 Idaho 428, 431, 987 P.2d 1043,
1046 (1999).
The court in Arreguin v. Farmers also reviewed the rules for
interpretation of an
parties and counsel.
construed
coverage.

against

the

insurance

contract that are

known

to

the

These are contracts of adhesion that are
insurance

company

drafter

in

favor

of

Ambiguities are resolved in the insured's favor with

exclusions not presumed or inferred.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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"When interpreting insurance policies, this Court
applies the general rules of contract law subj ect to
certain special canons of construction." Clark v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 540, 66
P.3d 242, 244 (2003). "The general rule is that, because
insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, typically not
subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity
that exists in the contract 'must be construed most
strongly against the insurer.'" Talbot, 133 Idaho at 432,
987 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v.
Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996)).
Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of
law over which we exercise free review. Id. ***
When we determine whether a policy is ambiguous we
ask "whether the policy 'is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation.'" Talbot, 133 Idaho at 432,
987 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Mut. of Enumclaw v. Box, 127
Idaho 851, 853, 908 P.2d 153, 155 (1995) (quoting City of
Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 51, 55, 878 P.2d 750,
754 (1994))). A provision that seeks to exclude the
insurer's coverage must be strictly construed in favor of
the insured. Moss v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
103 Idaho 298, 300, 647 p.2d 754, 756 (1982). The "burden
is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it
wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage." Id. ***
Furthermore, a provision excluding coverage is
strictly construed in favor of the insured and the
insurer has the burden to use clear and precise language
if it is restricting the scope of its coverage. Moss, 103
Idaho at 300, 647 P.2d at 756. "[Elxclusions not stated
wi th specificity Yv'i 11 not be presumed or inferred.
Clark, 138 Idaho at 541, 66 P.3d at 245.
ff

The issues raised by this case are matters of law,
evidence was taken and there are no findings of fact.
exercises

free

review over matters

of law.

See

since no

This Court

Iron Eagle v.

Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 Idaho 487, 491, 65 P.3d 509, 513
(2003); numerous other citations omitted.
The Idaho legislature has recently amended the Idaho Insurance
Code

on

casualty

insurance

contracts

to

make

it

clear

that

underinsured motorist coverage is required to be offered by all

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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casualty insurance companies in Idaho beginning January 1,

2009.

See

Idaho

amended

Idaho

Code

§

45-1502(1).

Further,

the

legislature also amended the definition of underinsured motorist
coverage at Idaho Code § 41-2503(2) to read as follows:
41-2503 (2) For purposes of under insured motorist
coverage, subject to the further definitions, terms and
conditions of such coverage, the term "underinsured motor
vehicle" means a motor vehicle that is a self-insured
motor vehicle, or a motor vehicle that is covered by a
policy of motor vehicle liability insurance or an
indemnity bond, with limits for bodily injury or death at
least equal to those limits set forth in section 49-117,
Idaho Code.

The plaintiff would submit

that her underinsured motorist

coverage policy falls within this definition.

The Hamilton Farm

Bureau policy provided the minimum policy limits in Idaho.
The District Court below found that, "The Idaho Supreme Court
has made statements in other cases which suggest that 9 statute
requiring uninsured motorist coverage does create a public policy
to be considered.

See, e.g, Erland v.

Nationwide Ins.

Co., 136

Idaho 131, 30 p.3d 286 (2001); Farmers Ins. Co. Of Idaho v. Buffa,
119 Idaho 345, 806 P.2d 438 (1991)."

The District Court then noted

that whether this amendment establishes a public policy favoring
under insured motorist coverage in Idaho is a question for the Idaho
Supreme Court.

R. 12.

The answer should be in the affirmative and

that constructive exhaustion should be the rule in Idaho.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

18

B.

MAJORITY RULE OF CONSTRUCTIVE EXHAUSTION SHOULD BE ADOPTED.
The

relevant

portions

of

the

defendant

American

Family

Insurance Company insurance policy and contract is attached to the
complaint as Exhibit 1 at R.

15-35.

The American Family policy

states, in part, on page 18 of the policy at R. 33 (the second to
the

last

page),

that

the

defendant

American

Family

will

pay

underinsured benefits as follows:
We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of
liability under any bodily injury liability bonds or
policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.
There are no Idaho cases on the validity of this exhaustion
clause.
held that

However,
the

the vast majority of other jurisdictions have

exhaustion

of

the

prior

coverage

clause

in

the

American Family policy is either unenforceable as against public
policy favoring settlements, or alternatively that a credit should
be given for the full amount of the policy limits but that the
plaintiff

may

litigate

her

claims.

See

Taylor

Employees Insurance Company, 90 Hawaii 302,

v.

Government

978 P.2d 740

(Hawaii

1999) excerpt, including a discussion with numerous other citations
in accord.
119

Ohio

See also Combs v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company,

App.3d

137,

694

N.E.2d

555

(Ohio

1997);

Providence Washington Insurance Company, 753 A2d 282

providing

that

a

credit must

be

given

for

the

Harper

(Pa.

amount

v.

2000),
of

the

underlying policy including the gap for litigation expenses saved;
Augustine v. Simonson, 940 P.2d 116, 238 Mont. 259 (Montana 1997);
Mann v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 108 Nev. 648, 836 P.2d 620, 621 (Nevada
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1992);

Mulholland

Ill.App.3d 600,

v.

State

527 N.E.2d 29,

338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983)

Farm

Mutual

Auto

Ins.

Co.,

171

(Ill. 1988); Schmidt v. Clothier,

(superseded by statute); Longworth v.

Van Houten, 223 N.J.Super. 174, 538 A.2d 414 (N. J. 1988); Hamilton
v. Farmers Ins. Co.
(1987);

1997).

Cobb

v.

of Washington, 107 Wash.2d 721,

482

Benjamin,

S.E.2d 589

733 P.2d 213

(South Carolina App.

Numerous other citations omitted, but set out below.

See

also District Court decision on motions for summary judgment below
in the record at R. 123-124.
In Taylor v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 90 Hawaii
302,

978 P.2d 740, 750-751

applicable law in detail.

(Hawaii 1999) the court discussed the
The court held as follows:

[W]e hold that exhaustion clauses are void as
against public policy. Many jurisdictions have concluded
that a UIM insurer cannot require that its insured
exhaust the tortfeasor's insurance prior to applying for
UIM benefits. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 506
So.2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Mulholland v. State
Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 527 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988);
Brown v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 1203 (Kan. Ct. App.
1992); Schmidt, supra; t"lann v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 836
P.2d 620 (Nev. 1992); Longworth, supra; Buzzard v.
Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991);
Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 680 A.2d 881 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996); Olivas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 850 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App. 1993); see also 3 Alan I.
Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance, §
44.2, at 357-359 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 1998). We agree
with the following reasoning of the Longworth court:
"The exhaustion clause requires that the insured
settle with or obtain judgment against the tort feasor in
the full amount of the tortfeasor's own liability
coverage before the UIM carrier has any payment
obligations at all under the UIM coverage. The adverse
impact of this clause on. the legislative purpose in
providing for UIM coverage is immediately apparent. It
means that the tortfeasor's carrier, by offering to
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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settle for a sum somewhat less than the policy limits,
can force the victim to trial solely in order to protect
his UIM claim. In effect then, the victim is denied the
perfectly reasonable choice of saving months, if not
years, of delay, trial preparation expense, and all the
ensuing wear and tear by simply accepting the offer and,
as a condition of proceeding with his UIM claim,
foregoing the difference between the tortfeasor's policy
limit and the tortfeasor's insurer's offer. This was in
fact the situation in Schmidt. In one of the cases there
reviewed, the tortfeasor's carrier offered to settle with
the victim for $22,000 out of a $25,000 liability policy.
One of the questions was whether the insured could accept
the offer without impairing his UIM rights. The court
concluded that because the exhaustion clause in this
respect was unenforceable, it could not bar the insured's
right to accept the offer.
Horace Mann Insurance Company v.

Adkins,

215 W.Va. 297,

599

S.E.2d 720 (2004), is one of the last cases to consider this issue.
The Court ruled on similar facts that the doctrine of constructive
exhaustion
motorist
insurance

allows

benefits
for

an

injured

under

damages

insured

his/her

that

own

exceed

policy

to

policy

the

when

collect

(1)

of

available
the

under insured
motor

limits

tortfea~or's

liability

underinsured

motorist

coverage

requires

exhaustion

tortfeasor's

applicable

liability

limits

a

as

vehicle

injured

of

a

insured's
of

a

prerequisite

to

his/her recovery of underinsured motorist benefits; (2) the injured
insured settles with the tortfeasor's insurer for less than the
tortfeasor's
insured,

full

liability

limits

that

are

available

but is treated as having received said full

to

the

liability

limits for purposes of recovering underinsured motorist benefits
under

his/her

own

policy

of

insurance;

and

(3)

the

injured

insured's recovery of underinsured motorist benefits is limited to
those

damages

that exceed the amount of
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liability limits available to the insured.

The court stated, at

footnote 12, that the majority rule is as follows:
"This position is consistent with a majority of
other courts that have examined exhaustion clauses in
policies of motor vehicle insurance. See, e.g., Omni Ins.
Co. v. Foreman, 802 So. 2d 195 (Ala. 2001); Country Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Fonk, 198 Ariz. 167, 7 P.3d 973 (2000); New
Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 506 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1987);
Taylor v. Government Employees Ins. Co., (supra) 90
Hawaii 302, 978 P.2d 740 (1999); In re Rucker, 442 N.W.2d
113 (Iowa 1989); Metcalf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 944 S.W.2d 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Faris, 27 Mass. App. ct. 194, 536 N.E.2d 1097
(1989); Linebaugh v. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 224 Mich.
App. 494, 569 N.W.2d 648 (1997); Schmidt v.Clothier, 338
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983), superseded by statute as stated
in Onasch v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 587 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989); Augustine v. Simonson, 283 Mont. 259, 940
P.2d 116 (1997); Barrett v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
295 N.J. Super. 613, 685 A.2d 975 (1996); Bogan v.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 22, 521 N.E.2d
447 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Ferrando v.
Auto-Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 98 Ohio St. 3d 186, 781 N.E.2d
927 (2002), review denied, 98 Ohio St. 3d 1463, 783
N.E.2d 521 (2003) (unpublished table decision); Buzzard
v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 824 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1991);
Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 323 Or. 291, 918 P.2d
95 (1996), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in Hamm v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 775
(Iowa 2000); Sorber v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 451
Pa. Super. 507, 680 A.2d 881 (1996); LeFranc v. Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 382 (R.I. 1991), superseded by
statute as stated in Sunderland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 717
A.2d 53 (R.I. 1998); Cobb v. Benjamin, 325 S.C. 573, 482
S.E.2d 589 (Ct. App. 1997); Leal v. Northwestern Nat'l
County Mut. Ins. Co., 846 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993); Hamilton v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 107
Wash. 2d 721, 733 P.2d 213 (1987). Despite the fact that
constructive
exhaustion
is
the
majority
view,
a
substantial number of states have, nevertheless, declined
to adopt this doctrine.
(Citations omitted).
The rationale for the constructive exhaustion rule was set out
by the District Court decision at R. 123-124.
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"A summary of

the arguments

motorist claims

in cases

in

favor

like this

Augustine, 283 Mont. at 266,

of allowing underinsured

were cogently set forth

in

940 P.2d at 120:

In sum, the policy reasons for not enforcing exhaustion
clauses include the following rationales.
Exhaustion
clauses promote litigation expenses which lessen the
insured's net recovery. The time involved in litigation
serves to delay payment of UIM benefits to the insured.
Furthermore, such clauses fail to recognize that the
insured may have a legitimate and valid reason for
accepting less than the tort feasor , s policy limits, i. e.,
the cost and risk of litigation and issues of proof.
They fail to consider that the under insured carrier can
compute its payments to the insured as if the insured had
exhausted
the
tortfeasor's
policy,
thereby
not
prejudicing the UIM carrier.
Finally,
under an
exhaustion clause the tortfeasor's carrier can force the
injured party to go to trial by offering less than the
policy limits, thereby increasing costs, litigation, and
delay.
We conclude that this reasoning is consistent with the
public policy of this State. It is also consistent with
the purpose of underinsurance, to provide indemnification
for accident victims when the tort feasor does not provide
adequate indemnification.
Sorensen, 927 P.2d 1002.
Furthermore, it is consistent with the declared public
policy of this State to encourage settlement and avoid
unnecessary litigation. Holmberg v. Strong (1995), 272
Mont. 101, 106, 899 P.2d 1097, 1100.
Therefore, we
conclude
that
the
provision
requiring
that
the
tortfeasor's liability insurance be entirely exhausted as
a prerequisite to securing indemnification from the
underinsured motorist coverage is contrary to the public
policy of the State of Montana and is unenforceable to
the extent that it violates public policy.u
The public policy of Idaho is also to encourage settlements
and avoid unnecessary litigation.

See Kohring v. Robertson,

137

Idaho 94, 99, 44 p.3d 1149 (2002); Loomis Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho
106, 108, 656 P.2d 1359 (1982); Loomis and Nettleeton Co. v. Tiger
Enterprises Inc., 99 Idaho 539, 542, 585 P.2d 949 (1978);

numerous

other citations omitted.
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American

Family

relies

heavily

on

the

Supreme

Court

of

Wisconsin case that ruled in their favor in the case of Danbeck v.
American Family Mutual

Ins.

review the entire decision

The Court should also closely

Co.

in

the

case of

Danbeck v.

Family Mutual Insurance Company, 629 N.W.2d 150, Wis.

first

thing

the

Court should note

is

that

this

American

(2001)

was

a

The

closely

divided opinion subject to a vigorous dissent by two justices,
including the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

The

dissent states that this decision was contrary to the established
Wisconsin

jurisprudence and other

law.

The

decision cited in

footnote number 3 of the brief include a total of six other states,
far

less

than

the

majority

of

the

decisions

from

other

jurisdictions that have found that the exhaustion requirement is
void as against public policy.
The plaintiff does not dispute the American Family contention
that some other jurisdictions that have found that the exhaustion
requirement is void as against public policy were based at least in
part on the statutes of these states.

However,

the other cases

were based on the common law and found to be void as against public
policy without reference to such statutes.

Finally,

even the

cases that were based on such statutes were based in part on the
common law.

These authorities from neighboring sister states like

Montana, Nevada, Washington, and Oregon, do travel well and this
majority rule should be applied in Idaho and in this case.
The defendant also cited the case of Qualcomm, Incorporated v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 161 Cal.App.4th 184 (Cal.
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4th Dist. Ct. Appeals, March 25, 2008) does not involve the issues
in this

case.

The

case

Qualcomm

involves

a

primary insurance

policy limits of 20 million dollars for a shareholder derivative
action dispute, and an excess policy issued by Lloyd's of London to
the Qualcomm Board of Directors.

The Court held that the primary

insurance would have to be exhausted before the secondary insurance
policy would be in effect.
This is a vastly different situation than the one before the
Court as the plaintiff Hill is a consumer

(rather than a

large

corporation), and her case involves under insured motorist coverage
(rather than a primary and excess dispute).

The Court noted that

excess insurance was expressly understood by both the insurer and
insured to be secondary to the specific underlying coverage which
will not attach until the primary coverage is exhausted.
Cal.Rpts.3d at 777.

See 73

The Qualcomm case was also contrary to other

existing California authority.
J.

CONCLUSION

The opinions of the courts to consider this issue as discussed
above are especially applicable in this case.

The plaintiff Hill

settled her case in good faith and reasonably exhausted the bodily
injury liability bonds or policies by payment or settlement, such
that proceeding further would have been futile,

consistent with

public policy of the State of Idaho.
The settlement in the Marcie Hill case for $24,000.00 on a

$25,000.00 policy limit satisfied the exhaustion requirement since
the

gap

between
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available under the policy limit approximates, or in this case, was
far less than the litigation costs saved.

The settlement by the

plaintiff Hill meant that she only has to try her case once to
obtain an adequate recovery, rather than twice against the original
defendant and her insurance carrier.
The plaintiff Hill has already stated that she is certainly
willing to allow the defendant American Family Insurance Company
credit for the amount of the underinsured coverage of $25,000.00
consistent

with

the

consider this issue.

opinion

of

Therefore,

the majority

of

the

courts

to

the Court should rule that the

American Family Insurance Company exhaustion clause does not bar
the plaintiff's claim.
The plaintiff Hill presents a compelling case for legal and
equitable relief from the provisions of strict interpretation of an
ambiguous policy provision buried deep in one paragraph on page 19
of her American Family policy.
to

require

judgments

only
or

reasonable

settlements

The policy provision should be read
efforts

from

to

the

exhaust

by

tortfeasor's

payment
policy

of
and

constructive exhaustion of all available benefits, not two trials
which would be a costly and a futile gesture in most cases.
The

majority

of

the

courts

from

other

jurisdictions

to

consider the precise issue in this case have concluded that the
exhaustion requirement is void and against public policy since it
will discourage settlement of the underlying litigation and require
two jury trials on the same claim.
from

other

jurisdictions
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contrary to even their own jurisprudence and reach a mechanical
unjust result.

The Court may give American Family Mutual Insurance

Company the full benefit of their bargain and policy language by
simply giving American

Family

full

credit

for

the

Farm Bureau

policy limits of $25,000.00.
WHEREFORE,

the plaintiff and appellant Marcie Rae Hill has

reasonably and constructively exhausted the

Farm Bureau policy

limits and the case should be allowed to proceed,

with American

Family to receive credit for the Farm Bureau policy limits.

The

District Court decision should be reversed and the case remanded
for a jury trial on merits.
Dated this 20 th day of July 2009.
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